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Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

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Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

- 11 States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 55/149, by the established deadline (see Section II of the report);
- No views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 42/154;
- 13 additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives (see Section III of the report), since the previous report (A/INF/56/6) on the topic.

* A/57/50/Rev.1.

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I. Introduction

1. On 12 December 2000, the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/149, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 2 to 13 of the resolution read as follows:

"*The General Assembly*,

"...

"2. *Strongly condemns* acts of violence against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as against missions and representatives of international intergovernmental organizations and officials of such organizations, and emphasizes that such acts can never be justified;

"3. *Also strongly condemns* the recent acts of violence against such missions, representatives and officials, referred to in relevant reports under this item;

"4. *Urges* States to strictly observe, implement and enforce the principles and rules of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations and, in particular, to ensure, in conformity with their international obligations, the protection, security and safety of the missions, representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above officially present in territories under their jurisdiction, including practical measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts against the security and safety of such missions, representatives and officials;

"5. *Also urges* States to take all necessary measures at the national and international levels to prevent any acts of violence against the missions, representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above and to ensure, with the participation of the United Nations, where appropriate, that such acts are fully investigated with a view to bringing offenders to justice;

"6. *Recommends* that States cooperate closely through, inter alia, contacts between the diplomatic and consular missions and the receiving State with regard to practical measures designed to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives and with regard to the exchange of information on the circumstances of all serious violations thereof;

"7. *Urges* States to take all appropriate measures, in accordance with international law, at the national and international levels, to prevent any abuse of diplomatic or consular privileges and immunities, in particular serious abuses, including those involving acts of violence;

"8. *Recommends* that States cooperate closely with the State in whose territory abuses of diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities may have occurred, including by exchanging information and providing assistance to its juridical authorities in order to bring offenders to justice;

"9. *Calls upon* States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives;

"10. *Also calls upon* States, in cases where a dispute arises in connection with a violation of their international obligations concerning the protection of the missions or the security of the representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above, to make use of the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the good offices of the Secretary-General, and requests the Secretary-General, when he deems it appropriate, to offer his good offices to the States directly concerned;

"11. *Requests* all States to report to the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 42/154 of 7 December 1987;

"12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to issue a report on the item, in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 42/154, containing also an analytical summary of the reports received under paragraph 11 above, on an annual basis, as well as to proceed with his other tasks pursuant to the same resolution;

"13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item

entitled 'Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives'."

2. By a note dated 10 December 2001, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 55/149 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report is prepared pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 55/149.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports.*

5. Section III of the present report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 15 May 2002, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,[1] the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963[2] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[3]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 55/149

6. The report by **Colombia**, dated 26 February 2002, was submitted in response to a report submitted by the Holy See on 13 June 2001 (A/INF/56/6, para. 14), referring to an incident involving the Apostolic Nunciature in Bogotá. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

> The incident that occurred on 18 December 2000 in the Apostolic Nunciature of Bogotá was resolved in a timely manner and without major injuries by that mission with the cooperation of the diplomatic police.
>
> The group that entered the Apostolic Nunciature was composed of street vendors who rejected some of the relocation measures ordered by the Mayor's Office of Bogotá and in this way were seeking to draw the attention of public opinion in favour of a prompt solution to their demands. The occupiers entered only as far as the garden, and after several hours were persuaded to leave in a friendly fashion.
>
> The State security organizations have put forward a number of studies and recommendations for avoiding incidents of this type with the diplomatic missions accredited to the city. It should be noted that the occupation of foreign missions in our country is not directed against the missions as such or against foreign officials. Normally what is sought is mediation and intervention by the international community in solving problems which would otherwise, as the promoters of such acts believe, produce an insufficient response from the national authorities.

7. **Belarus** submitted a report, dated 10 April 2002, describing the situation in Belarus regarding the protection of the diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, the incidents that occurred in 2001 involving the Russian and Polish embassies and the German consular section in Minsk and the measures taken in that connection. The relevant part of this report reads as follows:

> In the Republic of Belarus, special protection is currently being provided to 25 embassies, 11 consulates, 2 international organization missions, 4 residences of heads of foreign missions and the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
>
> Life- or health-threatening attacks against accredited representatives in the Republic of Belarus and the penetration into the premises of diplomatic missions or consulates by unauthorized persons is not permitted.
>
> Nevertheless, on 30 May 2001, at 11.40 p.m., an unidentified individual threw an explosive device onto the premises of the Russian Federation embassy on Starovilenskaya Street in Minsk. The explosion caused no casualties or material damage to the embassy building. A criminal investigation is under way.

* No views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 42/154.

In 2001, two citizens in a drunken state were arrested and prosecuted for attempting to penetrate the premises of the Polish embassy and the German consular section.

To avoid similar breaches in future, supplementary measures have been taken to strengthen the protection and security of foreign diplomatic missions and consulates in the Republic of Belarus.

With a view to ensuring a rapid response to emergency situations, a special vehicular patrol is being conducted around foreign diplomatic missions and consulates, and the patrol routes of territorial police divisions under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special protection departments have been brought within the vicinity of those premises.

Defence plans for the above-mentioned facilities have been elaborated, and operational and tactical training is being provided to police personnel to ensure their practical implementation.

All police stations are equipped with a telephone link and emergency buttons for urgent summoning of police reinforcements. Video equipment connected to police station monitors has been installed around the perimeter of many embassies and consulates.

The Belarusian authorities have also taken a number of precautionary measures to tackle the root causes and circumstances that facilitate terrorist acts and other crimes against officials of diplomatic missions, international organization missions and consular premises in the Republic of Belarus.

8. **Tunisia** submitted a report, dated 10 May 2002, indicating that there had been no reports of serious violations of the security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions in Tunisia in 2001 and provided the following information regarding the measures adopted with a view to enhancing the safety and protection of diplomatic and consular installations and representatives in the country:

It has been reported that the agencies involved in the protection of such installations and persons make use of field studies that take account of a range of objective factors, including the relative importance of the country concerned and its internal situation as well as threats that might be made against it for one reason or another. On that basis, some premises are provided with permanent protection and are guarded round the clock and others are guarded only at night or during official working hours.

This is in addition to the integrated and continuously maintained mesh of security around all of the foreign installations maintained in the country as well as the special precautions that are taken in connection with events that are specific to each mission, such as its national day and similar occasions, so as to enable rapid and effective intervention in case of need.

9. As regards the security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and personnel of Tunisia overseas, Tunisia reported that its three overseas missions had reported violations in two capitals in Africa and one in Europe, as follows:

- The theft of vehicles belonging to embassy personnel parked in front of the mission in the capital of a North African country, owing to negligence on the part of the security official of the country of accreditation who was assigned to guard the exterior;
- The mugging of an embassy staff member in the capital of an African country, in the city centre, by persons unknown;
- In the capital of a European country, attempted burglary of the residence and the burning of a stolen vehicle in front of the residence building. The wreckage was removed by the local authorities, despite repeated appeals, only after a delay of 54 days.

10. The report by **Norway**, dated 15 May 2002, contained information submitted in response to a report submitted by Turkey on 5 February 2001 (A/INF/56/6, para. 10), referring to an incident involving the Turkish embassy in Oslo. It also referred to incidents involving the embassies of Chile, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Portugal and Sweden and the Consulate General of Sri Lanka. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

Turkish embassy, 30 December 2000. Eleven windows at the embassy were broken and the walls were spray-painted with slogans. On the

fence surrounding the compound, a banner was attached with political slogans. Red paint was also thrown at the walls. No one has been arrested or charged.

Iranian embassy, 19 January 2001. Illegal demonstration by the "Iranian Communist Labour Party". Twenty demonstrators had held a demonstration earlier at a different location in Oslo and then proceeded to the Iranian embassy. After a while some of the demonstrators managed to get into the embassy premises and started pounding on the entrance door; they also threw eggs and stones at the entrance. They stopped when the police stepped in between the demonstrators and the entrance. The leader of the demonstration was charged by the police for the incident.

Iranian embassy, 3 March 2001. Fifteen to twenty people demonstrated outside the embassy. The demonstrators threw a partially burned veil and eggs at the building. The police intervened and the throwing stopped. The incident was not reported to the police by the embassy, and no one has therefore been arrested or charged.

Israeli embassy, 11 March 2001. A number of slogans were spray-painted on the walls of the embassy. Three bags filled with paint were also thrown. A group called "Campaign to Support the Intifada" claimed responsibility to a news agency. No one has been arrested or charged.

Indian embassy, 18 May 2001. Unknown perpetrators entered the embassy area and set fire to the Indian flag at the base of the flagpole. Several pictures and computer printouts were scattered around the base of the flagpole. No one has been arrested or charged.

Swedish embassy, 16 June 2001. Several windows were broken and the embassy was spray-painted with slogans. The police mounted a guard outside the embassy. No one has been arrested or charged.

Chilean embassy, 8-9 September 2001. Two cars belonging to the embassy were vandalized. No one has been arrested or charged.

Portuguese embassy, 27 September 2001. During the night someone had "sealed" the embassy's entrance with tape, glue and a piece of thread. Graffiti had also been sprayed on the walls of the embassy. No one has been arrested or charged.

Sri Lankan Consulate General, 22 September 2001. The Consulate General reported that someone had tried to steal a car belonging to a staff member during the night. The Consulate General believes that it was specially targeted, since there were no other attempts to steal cars in the same park. No one has been arrested or charged.

None of the above-mentioned incidents involved personal injury, and the Foreign Ministry has compensated damage to the property of the missions in cases where this has been requested. It has also covered the cost of removing graffiti.

Permission to demonstrate outside mission premises was granted on 37 occasions in 2001. Such demonstrations are always supervised by the police, who intervene if a demonstration develops in a way that could impair the dignity of the mission or pose a threat to its security. By far, the majority of the demonstrations were peaceful.

11. **Sweden** submitted a report, dated 15 May 2002, referring to a burglary of the Embassy of Honduras, an incident involving a diplomat of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and threats received by the embassies of the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe, as follows:

1. Honduras

On 2 March 2001, the police were called to the Embassy of the Republic of Honduras because of a night burglary. The lock for the emergency exit had been destroyed despite the presence of a security device. Some items had been stolen, including a PC, a scanner and a cellphone.

2. Iran (Islamic Republic of)

On 26 April 2002, a diplomat of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while refuelling at a gas station, was subjected to eggs thrown on him and his car by unknown persons. There were no personal injuries or damage to the car.

3. Syrian Arab Republic

On 12 March 2002, the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic received a letter containing an ill-defined threat. According to the embassy, the letter had been issued by the "Aramaic Democratic Organization". The letter urged Syrian Arab Republic to leave Lebanon.

4. Viet Nam

On 31 January 2002, the Embassy of Viet Nam received a threatening letter addressed to the Ambassador of Viet Nam to Sweden. The stamps were from Australia, but the letter was not postmarked. The message was: "Get out within 48 hours; otherwise face the consequences of a bombing." The police took the necessary measures to ensure the security of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

5. Zimbabwe

On 27 March 2002, the Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe informed the Division of Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it had been subjected to anonymous phone calls threatening to kill an African in Sweden for every white farmer killed in Zimbabwe.

12. **The Czech Republic, El Salvador, Monaco, Morocco, Oman and Uruguay** reported that there had been no violations during the reporting period.

13. **El Salvador**, in its report, dated 26 April 2002, provided information regarding various measures aimed at protecting the diplomatic and consular missions and representatives on its territory, as follows:

With regard to paragraph 9 of the resolution, we intend to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the international instruments in this field, including the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 1947.

In addition, Salvadoran legislation contains provisions dealing with these matters, particularly with regard to the role played by the National Civil Police in ensuring the security of eminent figures and the diplomatic corps:

1. Article 4, paragraph 14, of the Act organizing the National Civil Police stipulates that the functions of that force shall include protecting and ensuring the safety of eminent figures, in accordance with the relevant legislation.

2. The National Civil Police has established a VIP Protection Division which includes a Security Section that deals with embassies, diplomatic residences and representative offices of international bodies; the section has been allocated 300 officers and provides security for 26 embassies, 5 consulates, 26 diplomatic residences and 9 international bodies, and personal escorts for 9 ambassadors.

3. A security plan for such representative offices accredited to El Salvador has been developed and is being implemented.

4. The following are planned for this year:

- The establishment of a special anti-terrorist group to seek out information on terrorist groups and prevent any attempt to seize or attack the offices described above
- Improvement of the security plans for embassies, residences and representative offices of international organizations which are potentially at greater risk of terrorist attack
- The provision to all embassies, residences, consulates, security escorts and international organizations of communication radios
- The installation of alarms connected to the Police Response Unit
- Assignment of more police officers and vehicles to the VIP Protection Division and the allocation of vehicles to the Patrol and Security Supervision Section.

14. **Monaco**, in its report, dated 24 April 2002, also provided information of a general nature regarding the protection and public safety and security of foreign missions and representatives. The relevant portion of the report reads as follows:

The Principality of Monaco is generally considered to be a country in which security arrangements are highly satisfactory.

The protection of the staff and buildings of foreign delegations in Monaco is facilitated by:

- The small size of the country's territory, which enables the entire country to be constantly monitored;
- The density of the police network;
- The system of video surveillance cameras in the streets, which acts as an effective deterrent.

The Directorate of Public Security is the responsible department.

Strengthened surveillance of particular sites can be organized as needed.

The Directorate's services are kept informed of visits to Monaco by important personalities from other countries and, when needed, take appropriate measures to provide protection.

To date, no incidents affecting the persons or property of foreign representatives have been reported. Police officers are regularly briefed on the vigilance required according to developments in the international situation.

15. The report, dated 18 April 2002, provided by **Morocco** contained, inter alia, the following information on measures aimed at protecting the diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Morocco:

The diplomatic and consular missions and representatives present in Morocco have never been subject to serious violations of their protection or security.

However, they notify this department of any minor offences, such as thefts, committed at diplomats' residences or in respect of their vehicles.

As soon as they are notified, the police make every effort to investigate successfully and within the shortest possible time.

Guards are not stationed outside all diplomatic missions, owing to chronic staff shortages at police headquarters in the capital city. However, in the areas where chancellery and residential premises of diplomatic and consular missions are located, permanent security coverage is provided by motorized and foot patrols.

16. The report, dated 14 May 2002, submitted by **Uruguay** referred, inter alia, to the security measures aimed at protecting the diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Uruguay, as follows:

Preventive security measures

The police make daily rounds of the various diplomatic and consular missions, and measures to ensure their safety, security and protection have been increased.

Public security services are provided on the premises of diplomatic missions and related facilities when receptions and other official functions are being held there, and foreign dignitaries and delegations visiting Uruguay are guarded.

Suggestions concerning security measures

In most cases, the diplomatic missions accredited to Uruguay and the residences of foreign ambassadors are provided with basic police services by the Ministry of the Interior.

Apart from a security study of the residence of the Ambassador of Japan carried out at his express request, the specialized units of the Ministry of the Interior have not made any studies of the security needs of missions and residences, as they generally have their own specialized security staff.

III. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 15 May 2002[4]

17. Each instrument listed below is represented by the letter shown on the left in tables 1 and 2.

A: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51).

B: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI).

C: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964).

D: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77).

E: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967).

F: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967).

G: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

Table 1
Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
60	18	29	48	18	38	25

Ratification, accession or succession						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
180	49	62	165	38	46	119

Table 2
Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						
Albania	A							A			D			G
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			
Bangladesh								A			D			
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	
Belize								A			D			G
Benin				D		F		A			D			
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia				D				A			D			G
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Botswana								A	B	C				G
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Brunei Darussalam														G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C				
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cape Verde								A			D			
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G
China								A			D			G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros														
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						G
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			
Dominica								A			D			
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A			D			
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						
Fiji								A		C	D			

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia														
Georgia								A			D			
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			G
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			
Guinea-Bissau								A						
Guyana								A			D			
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			
Honduras								A			D			
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kiribati								A			D			
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A			D			G

State	Signature, accession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya								A	B		D			G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A			D			
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			
Maldives											D			G
Mali								A			D			G
Malta								A		C	D			G
Marshall Islands								A			D			
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	
Mexico	A			D				A			D		F	G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			
Monaco														
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		G
Mozambique								A			D			
Myanmar								A	B		D			
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A						
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			
Niue														
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														G
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D			G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A			D			G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis														
Saint Lucia								A			D			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			
Saudi Arabia								A			D			
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A						
Singapore														
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			
Spain								A			D			G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C				G
Sudan								A			D			G
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A	B		D	E		G
Tajikistan								A			D			G
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela	A			D				A			D			
Viet Nam								A			D			G
Yemen								A			D			G
Yugoslavia					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Zambia								A						
Zimbabwe								A			D			

Notes

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310, p. 95.

[2] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638, p. 261.

[3] General Assembly resolution 3166 (XXVIII), annex.

[4] For detailed information, see http://untreaty.un.org.